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 In the modern era, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are relatively 
effective to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI). Many countries 
then eagerly concluded BITs, including Indonesia. Considering the 
adverse impact of FDI on the environment, most countries then start 
putting the environmental concern in their BITs, assisting them to 
prevent and mitigate any adverse impact of FDI on the environment. 
Indonesia, however, did not follow this measure. This paper then shows 
the lack of the current Indonesia’s BITs in putting the environmental 
concern in their provisions. The fact that Indonesia has terminated some 
BITs becomes a right momentum to start putting the environmental 
concern in the updated and modified Indonesia BITs in the future. From 
other countries’ practices, there is evidence to suggest that BITs can and 
do contain provisions aimed at ameliorating environmental damage 
caused as a result of FDI within host countries’ territories. 
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1.  Introduction  
Globally, Foreign direct investment (FDI) declined 16 percent from US$1.47 trillion in 
2013 to US$1.23 trillion in 2014 due to unfavorable situations, including geopolitical 
tension, policy uncertainty, and the brittleness of the global economy.1 According to 
World Investment Report 2016, nevertheless, FDI increased significantly by 38 percent 
to be $1.76 trillion in 2015, recording the highest level since the global economic and 
financial crisis of 2008–2009.2  
The presence of FDI has contributed huge benefits for host countries. Firstly, FDI has 
created job opportunities that are crucial for reducing unemployment and poverty in 
																																								 																				
1  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2015). World Investment Report 2015: Reforming 
International Investment Governance. Geneva: United Nations, p. 2. 
2  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2016). World Investment Report 2016: Investor 
Nationality: Policy Challenges. Geneva: United Nations, p. x. 
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host countries. For instance, Richards and Schaefer unveiled that foreign-owned 
American firms employed 6.1 million people3 and 2.4 million indirect and induced 
jobs, resulting a total of 8.5 million jobs in 2013.4 Meanwhile, Lipsey and Sjoholm 
concluded that from 1975 to 2005, foreign-owned manufacturing plants provided more 
jobs compare to plants that remained under the national ownership during the same 
period in Indonesia.5 
The next benefit of FDI is the increase of productivity and export capacity. Arnold and 
Javorcik stated that the acquisition process from local to the foreigner improved 
productivity in the manufacturing sector in Indonesia.6 This progress was reached by 
means of technological advancement, superior know-how, managerial enhancement, 
marketing strategies, and motivational lesson for employees.7 With respect to export 
expansion, the presence of FDI is an important source for local firms to gain 
information relating how to export products, and then launch distribution channels in 
foreign markets.8 Specifically, Chen and Swenson summarised that FDI has contri-
buted to the increase of transaction unit values up to 6,3 percent, assisting local firms to 
expand new product exports by 1.3 percent in China.9 
Bearing in mind the benefits of FDI almost all countries then eagerly concluded 
Bilateral Investment Treaties to attract more FDI.10 Medvedev analysed the impact  of 
PTAs on the net FDI inflows of member countries,  utilising a comprehensive database 
of PTAs in a panel setting.11 The research found that PTA contributed a positive change 
in net FDI inflows.12  To illustrate, Costa Rica can expect its net FDI inflows to rise by 
11.5 percent after signing a PTAs  with the U.S.13 Neumayer and Spess that used 
econometric analysis, showed the participation of developing countries in BITs with  
capital-exporting countries could  hugely increase FDI inflows up to 93%.14  
Turning now to the discussion between FDI and environment, there have been critics 
from the existing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs) that they have not yet significantly encouraged the 
sustainable development principle in host countries, in particular developing 
																																								 																				
3  Richards, J., and Schaefer, E. (2016). Jobs Attributable to Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 
International Trade Administration. Available online at: http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/ 
public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_005496.pdf. [Assessed on 22 March 2017]. Indirect jobs are 
those created outside commercial firms, but they have strong relation with those firms. For examples, 
suppliers or material or independent contractor increasing the number of employees because they 
involve in the firm’s project. Induced jobs are those that were made because of the economic impact 
created by the commercial firms. 
4  Ibid. 
5  Lipsey, R., and Sjöholm, F. (2010). “FDI and Growth in East Asia: Lessons for Indonesia”, Working 
Paper No. 852, IFN, p. 20. 
6  Arnold, J.M., and Javorcik, B.S. (2009). “Gifted Kids or Pushy Parents? Foreign Direct Investment and 
Plant Productivity in Indonesia”. Journal of International Economics, 79: 42-48. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Chen, H., and Swenson, D.L. (2014). “Multinational Exposure and the Quality of New Chinese 
Exports”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 76: 41-56. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Neumayer, E., and Spess, L. (2005). “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct 
Investment to Developing Countries?” World Development, 33: 1567-1568. 
11  Medvedev, D. (2006). “Beyond Trade the Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements on Foreign Direct 
Investment Inflows”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4065, p. 3. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid. 43. 
14  Neumayer, E., and Spess, L., Op.cit., 1573. 
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countries.15 Evaluating the existing investment treaties, a closer look at the OECD data 
in 2011 reported that from 1,623 IIAs, which equal to 50 per cent of existing IIAs, only 
8.2 per cent of IIAs expressly put environmental concerns in their provisions.16 
Nevertheless, this figure fairly different if a time dimension was employed.17 There 
was a progressive movement, showing how the environmental concerns in IIAs began 
to rise since the mid 1990s.18 Moreover, starting from 2002, nearly 89% of newly 
concluded investment treaties explicitly mentioned environmental concerns in their 
provisions.19 
Although 89 percent of newly concluded investment treaties have accommodated the 
environmental concern, Indonesia did not follow this trend. Along with Egypt, 
Indonesia has only one treaty with the environmental concern. 20 The lack of 
environmental concerns in Indonesia’s BITs may cause difficulties for the government 
to anticipate any environmental damage from FDI projects, and to impose measures if 
the presence of FDI within Indonesia’s territory has damaged the environment. 
From 2014, Indonesia has denoted a tendency that it is no longer eager joining BITs. At 
the time of writing, according to UNCTAD Data, Indonesia has terminated 
approximately 24 BITs.21 There are several potential explanations for why Indonesia 
has terminated the BITs. Instead of a termination, Michael Ewing-Chow analysed this 
measure, arguing that “Indonesia is letting its bilateral treaties lapse so as to negotiate 
better ones”.22 Indonesian Ambassador to the European Union, Arif Havas Oegroseno 
then supported this assumption, stating that Indonesia intended to “update, modernise 
and balance its BITs”.23  
This paper argues that Indonesia’s BITs has significant deficiencies in putting the 
environmental concern in its provisions. This paper then shows how other countries 
have expressly stated the environmental concern, assisting their governments to 
prevent and mitigate any adverse impact of FDI on the environment. The termination 
of some Indonesia’s BITs will then likely be the right momentum to put any 
environmental concerns in the updated or modified version of Indonesia’s BITs. 
																																								 																				
15   Van Duzer, J.A. “Sustainable Development Provisions in International Trade Treaties: What Lessons 
for International Investment Agreements?” in Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski. (2016). 
Shifting Paradigms in International Investment Law: More  Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversified. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 143.  
16  Gordon, K., and Pohl, J. (2011). “Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements: A 
Survey”. OECD Working Papers on International Investment No. 2011/1, p.  8. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid. 
21  According to Investment Policy Hub of UNCTAD, Indonesia has terminated its BITs with Germany 
(signed in 1968), Norway (1969), Netherlands (1968), France (1973), Switzerland (1974), Singapore 
(1990), Italy (1991), Norway (1991), Viet Nam (1991), Hungary (1992), China (1994), Egypt (1994), Lao 
(1994), Malaysia (1994), Slovakia (1994), Netherlands (1994), Argentina (1995), Finland (1996), Romania 
(1997), Turkey (1997), India (1999), Cambodia (1999), Bulgaria (2003), Singapore (2005) see 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/97#iiaInnerMenu>. 
22  Chow, M.E., and Losari, J.J. (2014). “Indonesia is Letting its Bilateral Treaties Lapse So as to Negotiate 
Better Ones”. Financial Times (online). http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/20c6c518-c16c-11e3-97b2-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz43o1GWTNS. [Accessed on 17 March 2017]. 
23  Oegroseno, A.H. “Revamping Bilateral Treaties”. The Jakarta Post (online), 7 July 2014. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/07/07/revamping-bilateral-treaties.html. [Accessed on 18 March 
2017]. 
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This paper starts by showing the dynamics development of BIT, covering the period 
before BITs were exist, traditional BITs, and modern BITs wherein the rise of 
environmental concern has taken place. The dynamics development of Indonesia’s 
BITs are the next explanation, showing how the government has developed it BITs 
from old order to the reformation order in which most of its BITs have not 
accommodated yet the environmental concern. Looking at other countries’ practices, 
this paper will show why and how Indonesia should include the environmental 
concern in its future BITs. 
 
2.  The Dynamics Development of BITs 
2.1.  Before BITs 
The history of investment treaties can be traced from the Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation (FCN) treaties before the nineteenth century, providing for the protection 
of property and the commercial interests of foreigners.24 This type of protection 
emanated from the principle of  an “international minimum standard”, granting to 
aliens abroad.25 Equally important, as part of customary international law “the Hull 
Rule” required “prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation for any expropriation 
of property owned by foreigners.26 In this era, trade and property protection provisions 
existed in the same agreement.27 Equally important, the establishment of commercial 
relations among countries was the main priority of such treaties, with protection of 
property a secondary matter.28 The absence of an enforcement mechanism was a 
drawback of treaties in this period.29 
 
2.2. Traditional BITs 
After World War II,  treaties typically prioritised “favourable conditions” and “non-
discrimination” and required host states to pay compensation for any expropriation 
committed.30 Some improvements arose in this era including provision of protection 
for corporate entities in addition to individuals31 and protection against exchange 
controls.32 Moreover, as an enforcement mechanism, provision for dispute resolution 
																																								 																				
24  Chester Brown. “Introduction: The Development and Importance of the Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty’in Chester Brown (ed). (2013). Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 6. 
25  Jean d’Aspremont, “International Customary Investment Law:Story of a Paradox’ in Tarcisio Gazzini 
and Eric De Brabandere (eds). (2012).  International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations. 
Leiden: Nijhoff, p. 10. 
26  Andrew T. Guzman, “Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties” in Karl P Sauvant 
and Lisa E Sachs (eds). (2009). The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 74. 
27  Kenneth J. Vandevelde. “A Brief History of International Investment” in Karl P Sauvant and Lisa E. 
Sachs (eds). (2009). The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double 
Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 7. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Ibid. p. 5. 
31  Herman Walker Jr. (1956). “Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties,” American 
Journal of International Law, 50: 373 in Kenneth J Vandevelde, Ibid. 
32  Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan, signed 2 April 1953, 4 
UST 2063, art XII. 
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before the International Court of Justice was available to resolve uncertainties 
regarding the interpretation or application of the treaties.33 
Traditional BITs mainly involved developed countries and developing countries.34 
Unlike the FCN treaties, which had been focussed on economic relations,35 BITs existed 
to promote and protect investment. On the one hand, developed countries intended to 
protect their nationals investing abroad.36 On the other hand, developing countries 
intended to promote inward investment as a means of bolstering economic 
development.37 Typically, a developed country drafted the agreement and then offered 
it to a developing country for signature, with only minor changes in the final 
agreement compared to the proposed draft.38 
One important breakthrough in the mid-1960s was the adoption of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) whereby host countries agreed in BITs to resolve their 
disputes with investors via arbitration.39 This process was inspired by the conclusion of 
a 1965 convention establishing the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID).40 The presence of ISDS under investment treaties denoted a 
considerable shift under international investment law through the recognition of non-
state entities (ie investors) as subjects of international law.41 In the past, pursuant to 
“diplomatic protection”, an investor could only sue the state hosting its investment 
through its home state taking action on its behalf.42 Through ISDS, an investor could 
hold the host state responsible for violation of a BIT without depending on its home 
state.43 Moreover, ISDS does not generally require an investor  to exhaust domestic 
remedies prior to submitting a claim.44 
2.3. Modern BITs 
In the late 1980s, developing countries started providing more favorable environment 
for foreign investment, acknowledging how hostile policies to foreign investment were 
no longer effective.45 They then ignored the Calvo Doctrine and agreed to the adoption 
of international minimum standards for the protection of foreign investment.46 BITs 
																																								 																				
33  Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan, signed 2 April 1953, 4 
UST 2063, art XXIV. 
34  Kenneth J Vandevelde, Op.cit., P. 7. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Chester Brown, “Introduction: The Development and Importance of the Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty” in Chester Brown (ed). (2013). Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 6. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Kenneth J Vandevelde, Loc.cit. 
39  Ibid. p.7. 
40  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for 
signature 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159, (entered into force 14 October 1966). 
41  Jeswald Salacuse. (2010). The Law of Investment Treaties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 11 in Tania 
Voon, Andrew Mitchell and James Munro. (2014). “Parting Ways: The Impact of Mutual Termination 
of Investment Treaties on Investor Rights”. ICSID Review, 29: 454. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Stephan W Schill, “Private Enforcement of International Investment Law: Why We Need Investor 
Standing in BIT Dispute Settlement” in Michael Waibel, Asha Kausal et al. (2010). The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration. South Holland: Kluwer, p. 30. 
44  Voon, T., Mitchell, A., and Munro, J. (2014). “Parting Ways: The Impact of Mutual Termination of 
Investment Treaties on Investor Rights”.  ICSID Review, 29: 455. 
45  Salacuse, J.W. (1999). “From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in 
the Third World”. International  Law, 33: 882–86 . 
46  Kenneth J Vandevelde, op.cit., p.7. 
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provided greater protection for foreign investors than the Hull Rule ever did.47 Besides, 
they provided substantive protections such as national treatment, most favored nation 
treatment, free transfer of assets,48 and a prohibition on performance requirements.49 
Finally, BITs adopted the Hull Rule’s stipulation of prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation for expropriation.50 
While traditional BITs mainly arose between developed and developing countries, 
developing countries began concluding BITs with each other,51 in view of their capital 
exports to each other.52 For example, Thailand-Vietnam BIT in 199153 and China-
Argentina BIT in 1992.54 Next, the purpose of  modern BITs is not only intended to 
protect investment, but also to stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic 
development of the parties.55 For example USA-Uruguay BIT in 200556 and Norway 
Model BIT.57 
In this period, some countries have expressly included environmental concerns in 
relation to the sustainable development in their treaties, both in the preambles and/or 
provisions, reflecting the balance between rights and obligations of states and 
investors.  
From those existing treaties, Norway model BIT expressly admits how investment 
should be undertaken with the principle of sustainable development. It states that: 
“...the promotion of sustainable investments is critical for the further development 
of national and global economies as well as for the pursuit of national and global 
objectives for sustainable development, and understanding that the promotion of 
such investments requires cooperative efforts of investors, host governments and 
home governments.”58 
 
 
																																								 																				
47  Andrew T. Guzman, “Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties” in Karl P Sauvant 
and Lisa E Sachs (eds). (2009). The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 78. 
48   See, eg., Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed 14 November 1991 (entered into force 20 October 
1994)  arts II, II(2a), II(2b),  V (“USA-Argentina BIT”). 
49   See, eg., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed 12 March 1986 (entered into force 25 July 
1989) art II(6) (“USA-Bangladesh BIT”). 
50  Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, and Protocol, signed 23 August 1995 [1997] ATS 4 (entered into 
force 11 January 1997)  art 7 (“Australia-Argentina BIT”). 
51   Kenneth J Vandevelde, Op.cit., P. 28. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Agreement between The Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and  the Government of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, signed 30 October 1991 (entered into force 7 
February 1992) (“Thailand-Vietnam BIT”). 
54  Agreement between The Government of the People’s Republic of China and  the Argentine Republic on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed 5 November 1992 (entered into force 1 August 
1994) (“China-Argentina BIT”). 
55  Kenneth J Vandevelde, Loc.cit. 
56  Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed 4 November 2005 (entered into force 1 
November 2006) preamble (“USA-Uruguay BIT”). 
57  Norway Model BIT, Preamble. 
58  Norway Model BIT. 
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3. How Indonesia Has Developed Its BITs 
3.1. Old Order 
In the old order, Sukarno made Indonesia an inhospitable country for foreign investors 
through its nationalization policy. Almost all foreign enterprises were nationalized, 
commencing with Dutch-owned enterprises in 1957.59 Military officers, who had no 
experience in business, took over all those enterprises.60 The goal of this policy was to 
build a national industry organized by state-owned enterprises (‘SOEs’)61 and to 
respond to hostile measures by the Netherlands. After invading Indonesia in 1947 and 
1949, the Netherlands refused to transfer sovereignty over West Irian territory, 
resulting in military conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands during 1958-
1959.62 The expropriation policy over foreign investors then resulted in dire 
consequences in which Indonesia did not join to any BITs in this period. 
3.2. New Order 
In the new order under Suharto’s Administration, Indonesia experienced its golden era 
of investment agreements in which Indonesia had been active joining many BITs and 
treaties with investment provision (TIPs). Indonesia-Denmark BIT in 196863 was the 
first BIT and the last investment agreements in this period was Indonesia-Thailand BIT 
in February 1998, only three months before Suharto was finally resigned.64 Some 
important provisions of BITs are hereby explained. 
Most of Indonesia’s BITs provide wide definition of investment, covering any type of 
assets in compliance with host state’s laws and regulations. For instance, Indonesia-
Jordan BIT in 1996 states: 
The term ‘investment’ shall mean any kind of asset invested by investors of one 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, in conformity 
with the Laws and regulations of the latter, including but not exclusively: 
a. movable and immovable property as well as other rights such as mortgages, 
privileges, guarantees and any other similar rights; 
b. rights derived from shares, stocks, bonds or any form of participation in 
companies or joint venture in the territory of the other Contracting Party; 
c. claims to money or to any performance having a financial value; 
d. intellectual property rights, technical processes, good will and know – how; 
e. Business concessions conferred by law or under contract related to 
investment including concessions to search for, extract, or exploit natural 
resources.65 
																																								 																				
59  Organisation For Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010). OECD Investment Policy Reviews 
Indonesia 2010. Paris: OECD, p. 41. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Ibid. 
62  Adrian Vickers. (2013). A History of Modern Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 150. 
63  Agreement Between the Government of Denmark and The Government of the Republic of Indonesia concerning 
the Encouragement and the Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 30 January 1968 (entered into force 
2 February 1968) (“Indonesia-Denmark BIT”). 
64  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Thailand on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 17 February 1998 (entered into force 5 
November 1998) (“Indonesia-Thailand BIT”). 
65  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of The Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 12 November 1996 (entered into 
force 9 February 1999) art 1 (“Indonesia-Jordan BIT”). 
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Almost all Indonesia’s BIT includes provision requiring “fair and equitable treatment” 
and “full protection and security”. Only Indonesia-Denmark BIT in 1968 did not 
require the host state to provide “fair and equitable treatment” and enjoy “full 
protection and security”. For example, Indonesia-Korea BIT states that investors “shall 
at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy adequate 
protection and security in the territory of the other Party”.66 
In expropriation, almost all Indonesia BIT stipulates that expropriation either directly 
or indirectly must only be conducted with certain strict requirements. For instance, 
Indonesia-Jordan BIT in 1996 explains the following requirements of expropriation: 
The measures are taken for a lawful purpose or public purpose and under process of 
law; the measures are non-discriminatory; and the measures are accompanied by 
provision for the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation shall 
amount to the fair market value without delay before the measure of dispossession 
became knowledge...67 
Almost all Indonesia’s BITs provides MFN treatment. For example, Indonesia-Malaysia 
BIT in 1994 explains that: 
Investments made by investors of either Contracting Party in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party and/or return accrued, shall receive treatment which is 
fair and equitable, and not less favorable than that accorded to any third State. 68 
Almost all Indonesian BITs require compensation for losses that has to be conducted 
under non-discriminatory basis. For instance, Indonesia-Australia BIT in 1992 states 
that: 
When a Party, in respect of investments in its territory, adopts any measures 
relating to losses owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of 
national emergency, revolt, insurrection, riot or other similar event in its territory, 
it shall accord to investors of other Party treatment, as regards restitution, 
indemnification, compensation or other settlement, no less favorable than that 
which it accords to investors of any third country.69 
3.3. Reformation Order 
Indonesia continues its participation under investment agreements. In this period, 
Indonesia is less active in signing BITs, but more active in signing multilateral TIPs 
compare to those in previous eras. Indonesia’s BITs have similarities with the previous 
one particularly related to the definition of investment, protection of investment, 
treatment of investment, expropriation, compensation for loss and transfer.  
																																								 																				
66  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of Korea 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 16 February 1991 (entered into force 10 March 
1994) art 2(2) (“Indonesia-Korea BIT”). 
67  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of The Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 12 November 1996 (entered into 
force 9 February 1999) art 4 (“Indonesia-Jordan BIT”). 
68  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia, signed 22 
January 1994 (terminated) art 3 (“Indonesia-Malaysia BIT”). 
69  Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia concerning 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 17 November 1992 (entered into force 29 July 1993`) 
art V (“Indonesia-Australia BIT”). 
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Some differences of Indonesia’s BITs in this period are hereby explained. With respect 
to the application of other provisions, some BITs have included the provisions that are 
commonly known as “umbrella clause”. To illustrate, Indonesia-Germany BIT in 2003 
states that: “each Contracting Party shall observe any other obligation it has assumed 
with regard to investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting 
Party”.70  
The number of BITs that include National Treatment provision is increased, covering 
Indonesia’s BITs with India (1999),71 Germany (2003)72 and Singapore (2005).73 One TIP, 
that is Indonesia-Japan FTA (2007) also includes national treatment provision.74 For 
instance, Indonesia-Germany BIT in 2003 indicates that: 
Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments in its territory owned by 
investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favorable than it accords to 
investments of its own investors or to investments of investors of any third State. 75 
With respect to expropriation, Indonesia-Singapore BIT in 2005 elaborated the 
expropriation relating to land by stating that: 
Any measure of expropriation relating to land, which shall be as defined in its 
domestic legislation of each Contracting Party, shall be for a purpose and upon 
payment of compensation in accordance with the aforesaid legislation and any 
subsequent amendment thereto. 76 
 
3.4. The Recent Development: Termination BIT 
From 2014, Indonesia has shown a tendency that it is no longer enthusiastic joining 
BITs. At the time of writing, according to UNCTAD Data, Indonesia has terminated 
																																								 																				
70  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 14 May 2003 (entered into force 2 June 
2007) art 8(2) (“Indonesia-Germany BIT”), see also, Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
signed 26 March 1999 (entered into force 25 July 2000) art X (“Indonesia-Mozambique BIT”). 
71  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of India on 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 10 February 1999 (terminated) art 4(3) (“Indonesia-
India BIT”). 
72  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 14 May 2003 (entered into force 2 June 
2007) art 3 (“Indonesia-Germany BIT”). 
73  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of 
Singapore on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 16 February 2005 (terminated) art 3 
(“Indonesia-Singapore BIT”). 
74  Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Japan for an Economic Partnership, signed 20 August 2007 
(entered into force 1 July 2008) art 59 (“Indonesia-Japan FTA”). 
75  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 14 May 2003 (entered into force 2 June 
2007) art 3 (“Indonesia-Germany BIT”), see also, Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of India on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 
10 February 1999 (terminated) art 4(3) (“Indonesia-India BIT”); Agreement Between the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, signed 16 February 2005 (terminated) art 3 (“Indonesia-Singapore BIT”). 
76  Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of 
Singapore on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 16 February 2005 (terminated) art 4(3) 
(“Indonesia-Singapore BIT”). 
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approximately 24 BITs.77 The Netherlands embassy even revealed that the Indonesia 
had intended to terminate all of its BITs.78  
There are several potential explanations for why Indonesia has terminated the BITs. 
Instead of a termination, Michael Ewing-Chow analysed this measure, arguing that 
“Indonesia is letting its bilateral treaties lapse so as to negotiate better ones”.79 
Indonesian Ambassador to the European Union, Arif Havas Oegroseno then supported 
this assumption, stating that Indonesia intended to “update, modernise and balance its 
BITs”.80 Government then allowed its BITs to “discontinue” thereby providing an 
opportunity to renegotiate them with better terms.81  
Some scholars then analysed how Indonesia will likely want to secure its regulatory 
autonomy, especially in public policy matters. For instance, Trakman (2014) stated that 
Indonesia, which has a better economic stability, intended to renegotiate its BITs to 
provide greater capacity to regulate  the ‘public interest for health, the environment or 
financial reasons’.82 Price (2017) analysed how Indonesia will likely intend to balance 
investor protection with sustainable developmet issues in its new BIT model83 because 
the sustainable development has been a major concern in many countries that led to 
the importance of reorientation of the global IIAs regime.84 
 
4. The Lack of the Environmental Concern and Other Countries’ Practices 
Muchlinski,85 pointed out how the rise of investment treaties tended to only focus on 
economic factors, ignoring the implications of certain detrimental impacts. Hence, it is 
important to balance the legitimate interests of investors, such as transparent and 
predictable investment policy and the legitimate interests of the host country to reach 
its development targets, including a “right to regulate” for policy goals, especially 
environmental concern.86 UNCTAD (2015) stated that IIAs should not only include 
features of investment liberalization, protection, promotion and facilitation, but also 
features, enabling host countries to minimize any negative social or environmental 
																																								 																				
77  According to Investment Policy Hub of UNCTAD, Indonesia has terminated its BITs with Germany 
(signed in 1968), Norway (1969), Netherlands (1968), France (1973), Switzerland (1974), Singapore 
(1990), Italy (1991), Norway (1991), Viet Nam (1991), Hungary (1992), China (1994), Egypt (1994), Lao 
(1994), Malaysia (1994), Slovakia (1994), Netherlands (1994), Argentina (1995), Finland (1996), Romania 
(1997), Turkey (1997), India (1999), Cambodia (1999), Bulgaria (2003), Singapore (2005) see 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/97#iiaInnerMenu>. 
78  Netherlands Embassy in Indonesia, “Termination Bilateral Investment Treaty.” Available online at: 
https://www.netherlandsworldwide.nl/countries/indonesia. [Accessed On 23 February 2017]. 
79  Chow, M.E., and Losari, J.J. (2014). Op.cit. 
80 Oegroseno, A.H. “Revamping Bilateral Treaties”. The Jakarta Post (online), 7 July 2014. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/07/07/revamping-bilateral-treaties.html. [Accessed on 18 March 
2017]. 
81   Ibid. 
82  Trakman, L.E., and Sharma, K. (2014). “Indonesia’s Termination of the Netherlands–Indonesia BIT: Broader 
Implications in the Asia-Pacific?”. http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/08/21/indonesias-termination-of-the-
netherlands-indonesia-bit-broader-implications-in-the-asia-pacific/?print=print. [Accessed on 14 April 2017]. 
83  Price, D. (2017). “Indonesia’s Bold Strategy on Bilateral Investment Treaties: Seeking an Equitable 
Climate for Investment?” Asian Journal of International Law, 7: 135. 
84  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2014). “Reform of the IIA Regime: Four Paths 
of Action and a Way Forward”. Issues Note No. 3, p. 3. 
85  Muchlinski, P. “Policy Issues” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds). 
(2008). The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 12. 
86  Ibid, p.15. 
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impacts.87 This process then can be reflected through the inclusion of environmental 
concern both in the preamble and provision in the current IIAs, including BITs. 
A study from Gordon and Pohl (2011) revealed that 133 international investment 
treaties, equal to 8,2 percent of the sample, contained environmental concerns.88 
Nevertheless, from 2002 onwards, 89 percent of newly concluded agreements 
contained environmental concerns in their preambles and/or provisions.89 The study 
also showed how 30 out of 49 countries (assessed by this study) have put environ-
mental concerns in at least one of their treaties.90 The following countries have a high 
percentage of such concern: Canada (83 percent), New Zealand (75 percent), Japan (61 
percent), the United States (34 percent) and Finland (26 percent).91 In contrast, Egypt 
and Indonesia have just one agreement with environmental concern out of 73 and 45 
agreements in the sample, respectively.92 
The above-mentioned study then supports the fact that Indonesia did not follow the 
trends of incorporating environmental concern in international investment agreements. 
This situation potentially contributes to the environmental damage after the presence 
of FDI. The lack of environmental concerns in Indonesia’s agreements may cause 
difficulties for the government to anticipate any environmental damage from FDI 
projects, and to impose measures should the presence of FDI within Indonesia’s 
territory has damaged the environment. 
Some other countries have put environmental concerns in the preamble of their 
agreements. The US-Uruguay BIT (2005) notes that the parties desire to achieve the 
economic objectives “in a manner consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the 
environment”.93 Meanwhile, the Switzerland-Kosovo BIT (2011) recognizes the need to 
promote and protect foreign investment with the objective to achieve the economic 
prosperity and sustainable development of both states.94 Next, the preamble of the 
Economic Partnership Agreement between the Cariforum States and the European 
Community (‘EC–CARIFORUM EPA’) (2008) considers the need of the parties “to 
promote economic and social progress for their people in a manner consistent with sustainable 
development by respecting basic labour rights … and by protecting the environment”.95  
The preambles reflected the main objective and purpose of the international invest-
ment agreements that become a vital element of their interpretation although there are 
no legally binding obligations imposed by the preambles.96 If parties do not include 
environmental concern in their preambles, the interpreters (such as tribunals) of the 
																																								 																				
87  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2015). Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development. Geneva: United Nations, p. 30. 
88  Gordon, K., and Pohl, J. (2011). “Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements: A 
Survey”. OECD Working Papers on International Investment, p. 9. 
89  Ibid. 
90  Ibid. 
91  Ibid. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Treaty between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed 4 November 2005 (entry into force 1 
November 2006) the preamble. 
94  Treaty between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Kosovo concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed 27 October 2011 (entered into forced 13 June 2002) the 
preamble. 
95  Economic Partnership Agreement between the Cariforum States, of the one part, and the European Community 
and its Member States, of the other part, signed 15 October 2008, the preamble. 
96  Bonzon, A.J. (2014). “Balance Between Investment Protection and Sustainable Development in BITs: 
The Example of Switzerland” The Journal of World Investment and Trade, 15: 822. 
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agreements will have less guidance how their obligations should be interpreted, 
leaving more discretion to the interpreter.97 Hence, putting environmental concern in 
the preambles can ensure that this concern is taken into account by the interpreters of 
the treaty.98  
Some other countries then put provisions, emphasizing the regulatory autonomy of the 
host state to impose measures in relation to environmental concerns. Article XVII(2) 
Canada-Ecuador BIT (1996) stipulates that 
“[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party 
from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with 
this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in 
its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”99 
Article 21(2) Japan-Colombia BIT (2011) then notes: 
“Each Contracting Party may adopt, maintain or enforce any measure that it 
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activities in its Area are 
undertaken in a manner not incompatible with its environmental law, provided 
that such measure is consistent with this Agreement.”100 
Some countries have gone further by incorporating some additional requirements in 
relation to the protection of the environment in their agreements. Firstly, the provision 
that prohibits countries to relax environmental standards while attracting FDI. 
Specifically, Article 12(2) of the US Model BIT (2012) states that: 
“[t]he Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws. 
Accordingly, each Party 'shall' ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate 
from or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from its environmental laws in a 
manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those laws, or fail to 
effectively enforce those laws through a sustained or recurring course of action or 
inaction, as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or 
retention of an investment in its territory.”101 
Article 3 Switzerland and Mexico BIT (1995) then shows: 
“[t]he Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, neither 
Party should waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or derogate, such 
measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or 
retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If either Party considers 
																																								 																				
97  Van Duzer, J.A., Simons, P., and Mayeda, G. (2013). Integrating Sustainable Development into International 
Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Country Negotiators. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2013, p. 45. 
98  Ibid. 
99  Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Equador for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 29 April 1996 (entered into force 6 June 1997) 
art. XVII(2), See also, for example North American Free Trade Agreement, signed 17 December 1992 (entry 
into force 1 January 1994) art. 1114. 
100  Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Colombia for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of 
Investment, signed 12 September 2011 (not yet in force) art 21(2). 
101  The United States Model BIT (2012) art. 12 (2). 
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that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request 
consultations.”102 
Canada-Cameroon BIT (2014) then includes the issue of corporate social responsibility 
by stating that: 
“[e]ach Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or 
subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized 
standards of corporate social responsibility in their internal policies, such as 
statements of principles that have been endorsed or are supported by the Parties. 
These principles address issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, 
community relations and anticorruption.”103 
 
5. Conclusion 
Considering the huge benefits of the FDI for host countries, most of countries then 
eagerly concluded BIT to attract more FDI. Due to the adverse impact of FDI on the 
environment, there have been some critics, arguing the lack of the environmental 
concern from BITs. Responding this issue, almost 90 percent of newly concluded BITs 
have included the environmental concern in their provisions. Indonesia’s BITs, 
however, has significant drawbacks in relation to the environmental concern. Most of 
Indonesia’s BITs have not included yet any environmental concerns in their provisions. 
The fact that Indonesia has terminated its BITs becomes a good momentum to start 
putting the environmental concern in the future Indonesia BITs. From other countries’ 
practices, there is evidence to suggest that BITs can and do contain provisions aimed at 
ameliorating environmental damage caused as a result of FDI projects, both in the 
preamble and the provision. For these reasons, the host country’s government is more 
likely be able to anticipate any environmental damage from FDI projects, and to 
impose measures if the presence of FDI within its territory has damaged the 
environment. 
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